Digest: Monteroso v. CA

Monteroso v. CA
553 SCRA 66, G.R. No. 105608; April 30, 2008

Facts:

In 1906, Don Fabian married Soledad Doldol. Out of this marriage were born Soledad,Reygula, Benjamin, and Tirso. On April 8, 1927, Soledad Doldol Monteroso passed away. A little over a year later, Don Fabian contracted a second marriage with Sofia Pendejito. From this union were born Florenda, Reynato, Alberto, and Fabian, Jr.Don Fabian filed an intestate proceeding for the estate of his deceased first wife to avoid disputes over the inheritance of his children from his first marriage.Land: Parcels F-1 to F-8 (First marriage) and Parcels S-1 to S-4 (Second marriage).

The partition in SP No. 309 covered Parcels F-1 to F-5, and adjudicated to Don Fabian the whole of Parcels F-1, F-2, and F-3, and one-half of Parcel F-5, while the intestate estate of Soledad D. Monteroso comprised the whole of Parcel F-4 and one-half of Parcel F-5. The intestate estate of Soledad D. Monteroso was partitioned and distributed to her four children in equal shares. On October 26, 1948, Don Fabian also passed away.On July 28, 1969, the children of the late Benjamin D. Monteroso, filed with the RTC a Complaint for Recovery of Property with Damages against their uncle, Tirso D. Monteroso. As the heirs of Benjamin alleged in their complaint, their uncle, Tirso, was entrusted with one-fourth portion of Parcel F-4 as part of the share from the estate of Soledad D. Monteroso allotted to their father. However, their uncle refused to surrender and deliver the same when they demanded such delivery upon their reaching the majority age.

    Tirso countered that the portionpertaining to Benjamin was never entrusted to him; it was in the possession of their sister, Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, who was not entitled to any share in Parcel F-4, having previously opted to exchange her share in said property for another parcel of land, i.e., Parcel F-7, then being occupied by her. Tirso, in turn, filed a Complaint for Partition and Damages with Receivership, involving 12 parcels of land against his stepmother, Pendejito, and all his full and half-siblings and/or their representatives:

(1) The aforementioned 12 parcels of land belong to the conjugal partnerships of the first and second marriages contracted by Don Fabian;

(2) SP No. 309, which purportedly judicially settled the intestate estate of his mother, is null and void for the reason that the project of partition failed to comprehend the entire estate of the decedent as Parcels F-6, F-7, and F-8 were excluded, thereby depriving Tirso of his one-fourth share or legitimate over the said three parcels of land; and

(3) Parcels S-1 to S-4, having been acquired during the second marriage of Don Fabian, are not paraphernal properties of Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso

 

RTC found that the heirs of Benjamin have indeed been deprived of their inheritance which corresponds to one-fourth share due their father from the intestate estate of their grandmother. Turning on the alleged sale of Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, F-7, and F-8 by Don Fabian to Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, the RTC found the covering three deeds of absolute sale to be null and void for the reason that the alleged conveyances were fictitious, simulated, and/or without sufficient consideration. The RTC also declared as null and void the donation of Parcel F-5 to Reygula Monteroso-Bayan, as one of the signatory-donors, Mauricia Nakila, Benjamin’s widow, did not have the right to effect a donation because she was not a compulsory heir of her husband by representation.

Issue:

Whether the CA erred in upholding partition as the proper remedy of private respondent Tirso Monteroso to recover the properties sold by Fabian Monteroso, Sr. to Soledad D. Monteroso de Cagampang when co-ownership is not pleaded as theory in the Complaint

 

Ruling:

 

No. Petitioners, citing Article 494 of the Civil Code what the appellate court tried to convey is clear and simple: partition is the proper remedy available to Tirso who is a co-owner of the subject properties by virtue of his being a compulsory heir, like siblings Soledad, Reygula, and Benjamin, of Don Fabian. The right to seek partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches. Consequently, acquisitive prescription or laches does not lie in favor of the Cagampang spouses and against Tirso, the general rule being that prescription does not run against a co-owner or co-heir. The only exception to the imprescriptibility of an action for partition against a co-owner is when a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership. Thus, the appellate court ruled that by invoking extinctive prescription as a defense, the lone exception against imprescriptibility of action by a co-owner, the Cagampang spouses are deemed to have contextually recognized the co-ownership of Tirso and must have repudiated such co-ownership in order for acquisitive prescription to set in. The fact that Tirso and the other compulsory heirs of Don Fabian were excluded from the possession of their legitime and the enjoyment of the fruits thereof does not per se argue against the existence of a co-ownership

·         By asserting his right as a compulsory heir, Tirso has effectively brought into the open the reality that the Cagampang spouses were holding some of the subject properties in trust and that he is a co-owner of all of them to the extent of his legal share or legitime thereon

·         Before partition and eventual distribution of Don Fabian’s intestate estate, a regime of co-ownership among the compulsory heirs existed over the undivided estate of Don Fabian. Being a co-owner of that intestate estate, Tirso’s right over a share thereof is imprescriptible

·         Tirso has at the very least 10 years and at the most 30 years to file the appropriate action in court. The records show that Tirso’s cause of action has not prescribed as he instituted an action for partition in 1970 or only nine years after the considered express repudiation

·         Regarding Parcel S-1, the court ruled that it belongs to all the heirs of Don Fabian and not a paraphernal property of Pendejito as it was under a homestead patent application. Sec 105 of CA 141 which governs such provides that the applicant shall be succeeded in his rights andobligations by his heirs in law after the latter performs all the requirements therefor. Pendejito shall only be entitled to a usufructuary right over the property equal to the corresponding share of each of the heirs.